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Summary: In numerous writings Philip Kitcher argues
against the thesis that understanding nature or sear-
ching for truth in general are goals that are shared by
all the sciences. Neither do the sciences aim for com-
mon distinctive truths, such as natural laws. Thus, the
question is: can the sciences be characterized as sciences
by one of their goals? According to Kitcher this seems
possible. The sciences, so he claims, aim for unificati-
on. In this paper I shall argue that unification should
not be understood as an aim but rather as a method
the sciences use depending on the specific problems they
pursue. Therefore, it seems, there is not one goal for all
the sciences.
In ‘The Ends of the Sciences’, Philip Kitcher sets out to show that
the whole scientific context – including the so-called “context of
resolution” – is socially embedded and therefore value-laden. I
propose to use his line of argument in order to address the que-
stion of whether there is one end or goal that is shared by all the
sciences.
Considering the diversity of the sciences, there do not seem to
be many likely candidates. Biologists study life and living orga-
nisms, physicists the nature of matter and its motion through
space-time, and political scientists describe and analyse political
systems. Subject matters and their respective guiding questions
could not be more diverse. This is not surprising, of course, for
the diversity of the sciences is reflected in their different questions
and, hence, in their different goals. However, it does not seem far-
fetched to assume that, among all the various goals of sciences,
there is at least one that is shared by them all. I am thinking of
truth. All sciences, or so it seems, seek truth.
Its obvious character notwithstanding, truth cannot figure as the
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common goal for all sciences, for, as Kitcher rightly points out,
the slogan “‘Seek truth!’ is plainly incomplete.” First of all, a que-
stion has to be framed. Only then is “the goal of finding a true
answer [...] a sensible one.” (Kitcher 2004: 212.) That is, there
are always particular types of truth that sciences look for. Accor-
dingly, our question has to be whether there are certain types of
truth, which all sciences look for. As a matter of fact, such types
of truth do seem to be available. For sciences seek the possibility
of prediction and intervention in broad areas. That is, they need
statements that explain individual special cases as instances of
a common type. Therefore, it seems, sciences need natural laws.
We could say, then, that the goal of the sciences is not the search
for truth, for this is too general, but the search for a distinctive
type of truth, namely natural laws.
However, it cannot easily be taken for granted that natural laws
are indeed the goal of all the sciences. For, as is well known, there
are many sciences such as history, political sciences, philosophy,
and even natural sciences such as biology, whose findings do not
take the form of natural laws. Of course, this need not be an
argument against the thesis that sciences aim at finding natural
laws. After all, one could say that those disciplines that do not
or cannot share this end simply do not count as sciences; and for
disciplines such as philosophy, sociology or literature, there are
numerous scholars who do indeed share this opinion.
However, this view might be nothing but mere stipulation. What
we need is a separate argument, one that shows why it is only the
quest for natural laws that qualifies a discipline to be a science.
Yet there is also an alternative strategy: in order to examine the
thesis that only those disciplines that aim at finding natural laws
can be counted as sciences, we might examine and evaluate its
(tacit) assumptions. Kitcher points out the following: on the one
hand, “it supposes that there’s some general project of under-
standing nature,” and on the other hand, “it assumes that the-
re’s some manageable collection of laws that can be appreciated
by human beings (or by a recognizable idealization of ourselves)
and that will make possible the general project.” (Kitcher 2004:
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213-14) These two assumptions go together with a third, which
is almost trivial: at least one science is needed that has the col-
lection of natural laws as its main goal. If other disciplines, those
whose generalizations do not take the form of natural laws, are
to count as sciences, too, then they would need to be reducible,
in one way or another, to this special science. One science that
aims at discovering natural laws is, of course, physics. Accordin-
gly, physicalism would be the position to be held.
All three assumptions, however, present well-known difficulties.
Firstly, after the appearance of “There is no Question of Physi-
calism” by Crane and Mellor, at the latest, physicalism appears
to be no longer tenable. (Crane & Mellor 1990) For physicalism
faces the following dilemma: Who decides what is to count as a
physical object? An obvious answer is, of course, physicists; but
which physicists do we mean: the exponents of the current, or
of an idealized, complete, future physics? If the first are meant,
then physicalism is presumably false. For, it is not very likely
that present-day physics has identified all the physical entities.
If, however, an idealized, complete future physics is meant, then
physicalism amounts to something trivial. After all, an idealized
and complete physics would necessarily pick out all basic entities,
of whatever kind they might be. Yet, how are we to exclude the
possibility that, among these basic entities, there are also num-
bers or qualia; entities that, as far as we know, are not objects of
natural laws?
But even if we accept physicalism, there are further problems with
the assumption that the sciences aim at finding natural laws. For
it presupposes that it is possible for sciences both “to fall into a
finite number of clusters, each of which can be subsumed under
a finite number of basics laws” and to “extend beyond the areas
of inquiry that have so far emerged in the actual history of the
sciences to cover all the phenomena.” As a matter of fact, if these
things were possible, the assumption, that there is some collecti-
on of laws which can be appreciated by human beings (or by a
recognizable idealization of ourselves) and which makes possible
the general project of understanding nature, could be sustained.
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(Kitcher 2004: 214) Yet, as Kitcher rightly remarks, “once the
unity-of-science picture has been discarded, there’s no basis for
thinking that the clusters of laws (even assuming we can always
find them) won’t proliferate indefinitely.” (Kitcher 2004: 215)
A third problem presented by these assumptions lies in the idea
of a general project of understanding nature. For, the slogan “Un-
derstand nature!” is as incomplete and as meaningless as the
slogan “Seek truth!” (Kitcher 2004: 215). In addition, there is
the question of what is meant by “nature“? It is obvious that
attempts to answer this question present the same dilemma as
physicalism.
Therefore, it seems we have good reasons to abandon the thesis
that only those disciplines whose goal is the discovery of natu-
ral laws can count as sciences. Do we have an alternative end,
then, that might characterize all the sciences? Having dismissed
the above-mentioned ends Kitcher, himself, makes the following
suggestion. Sciences, so he claims, have a common ideal: they all
aim at unity. Contrary to appearance, this is not a lapse back to
the unity-of-science movement: for Kitcher, as well, there is and
can be no unity of science.
Nevertheless, he claims, sciences reflect a regulative ideal, name-
ly “the ideal of finding as much unity as we can by discovering
perspectives from which we can fit a large number of apparent-
ly disparate empirical results into a small number of schema-
ta.” (Kitcher 1999: 339) Thus, sciences exemplify what Kitcher
calls “modest unificationism“. This unificationism is modest in at
least two ways: on the one hand, as just, seen, it maintains that
sciences cannot be unified for the reasons mentioned in the be-
ginning. Therefore, on the other hand, this unificationism allows
for different unifying schemes for explaining and predicting va-
rious aspects of nature; schemes, that “aren’t integrable into any
overarching grand theory.” (Kitcher 2004: 347). What holds all
sciences together, therefore, is not that they are reducible to one
special science but that they are all modestly unificationist. All
sciences aim at unification. Unification is their regulative ideal.
In what follows, I want to challenge this idea. Using an argument
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recently provided by Ingo Brigandt, who refers to the relatively
new discipline of evolutionary-developmental biology, I want to
suggest that unification should not be understood as an aim in
itself but rather as a method. (Brigandt 2010) Unification, or the
combination of concepts, disciplines or theories, or so I want to
argue, is a method whose application depends only on the pro-
blem pursued. The idea is to strike a balance between (modest)
unificatory approaches and pluralistic approaches according to
which sciences are, and always will be, a disunified plural. (Du-
pre´ 1993)
First of all, a few words on evolutionary-developmental biology,
short: evo-devo. As the words already suggest, evo-devo aims at
an integration of the long separated disciplines of evolutionary
biology and developmental biology. This enterprise is motivated
by the fact that, in addition to adaptation and speciation, the-
re are other questions about evolution, such as the question for
phenotypic evolvability or the question of the evolutionary ori-
gin of body plans and novel structure, which cannot be answered
by referring merely to neo-Dawinism. Here, an appeal to develop-
mental biology is required. There are several reasons for this. One
important reason is that the genes that are involved in import-
ant early developmental events are shared across large groups of
animals (mammals and insects, for instance). Therefore, it seems
obvious that phenotypic evolution cannot be explained by merely
referring to specific changes in genes. What appears to be needed
instead is an explanation of evolutionary changes in the regulati-
on of gene activations. What appears to be needed is knowledge
of development (Hall & Olson 2003).
Appearances to the contrary, notwithstanding, evo-devo should
not be seen as a simple synthesis of evolutionary and develop-
mental biology, with developmental genetics providing the link.
For, many evo-devo problems, such as accounting for the origin of
novel structures, require “integrating knowledge from many diffe-
rent disciplines, including population genetics, developmental bio-
logy, phylogeny, palaeontology, morphology, theoretical biology,
and ecology.” (Brigandt 2010: 298; also: Hall 2007; Wagner 2007)
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Now, how and, above all, why are all these disciplines integrated?
Let us, as Brigandt does, take a look at the explanation of evolu-
tionary novelties. Evolutionary novelties have to be distinguished
from variations. While a variation is a gradual change of an exi-
sting feature in an ancestral species, an evolutionary novelty, on
the other hand, is described by Ernst Mayr as “any newly acqui-
red structure or property that permits the performance of a new
function.” (Mayr 1963: 602) That is, evolutionary novelties are
qualitatively new morphological structures or function features
in a group of organisms that did not exist in an ancestral species.
Examples are the vertebrate jaw, feathers and flight in birds, the
turtle carapace, and paired fins in fish and their transformation
into limbs in amphibians.
What seems clear is that for an explanation of these novelties phy-
logeny is extremely relevant. For, what is needed is a determina-
tion of the particular phylogenetic junctures at which characters
were transformed and novelties arose in evolution. Thus, any ex-
planation of the origin of novelties needs phylogentic trees. Now,
these trees were usually based on an analysis of classical cha-
racters, such as morphological structures. But nowadays, they
are also inferred from molecular data, such as gene sequences.
Thus, the problem is to integrate both approaches. This is chal-
lenging since there are several cases where each supports a diffe-
rent phylogeny. Despite attempts to combine “both kinds of data
(by so-called total evidence approaches), there are currently no
generally agreed upon methods of determining how to weigh the
contribution of classical and molecular information.” (Brigandt
2010: 299f.) However, both approaches are important in order to
explain novelties. This holds as well for palaeontology. It supports
phylogeny in the explanation of novelties, in that its research in-
to past organisms can provide information about the ancestral
states of characters. And even more importantly, palaeontology
determines if there are structural intermediates between the state
and the descendant. On that basis it can suggest particular mor-
phological changes that may have constituted the origination of
the novel feature.
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Disciplines such as ecology and biogeography are also indispensa-
ble in this context. Without them it would be impossible to get
an exhaustive explanation of the evolution of novelties. For, of
course, not only the novelties themselves but also the transitio-
nal states before them must have been positively favored by, or
at least compatible with, natural selection. Therefore, in addition
to having knowledge of the existence of structural intermediates,
knowledge of the changes in geographical and ecological conditi-
ons undergone by a certain species is necessary.
But here again we have two levels of explanation: the microevo-
lutionary level of neo-Darwinism that focuses on change in gene
frequencies within a species and the palaeontological macroevo-
lutionary level of large-scale trends that involves many species.
Once again, both levels have to be integrated. “For while the ad-
vent of major novelties (such as the evolution of limbs) or whole
body plans involves macroevolutionary events, at the same ti-
me it has to be made plausible how the advent of a phenotypic
novelty can be consistent with modes of genetic change within
populations.” (Brigandt 2010)
But why, one might ask, is neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory,
with its use of population genetics, not in a position to account
for the origin of novelties, by itself? Brigandt provides the followi-
ng reasons. (Brigandt 2010: 300f.) Firstly, if the task is to explain
how and why phenotypic variation could have been produced, at
all, neo-Darwinism cannot provide an exhaustive answer. For,
neo-Darwinism explains phenotypic change based on natural se-
lection. And natural selection, as is well-known, acts on heritable
phenotypic variation that already exists. Thus any theory that ap-
peals to natural selection alone faces difficulties when it comes to
the explanation of novelties. This is not surprising, of course, for
explanations based on natural selection are by their nature retro-
spective. The explanation of new things, on the other hand, must
involve some prospective or developmental aspects. Of course,
there is some knowledge of which mechanisms produce genotypic
variation, but this is not a question to be answered in this con-
text. For, we want to know “how genotypic variation translates
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into phenotypic variation – which is the domain of developmental
biology.” (Brigandt 2010: 300f.; also Kirschner & Gerhart 2005)
Another reason Brigandt appeals to is that not every genetically
produced phenotypic variation is developmentally possible. Thus
there are genetically possible phenotypic variations that are more
or less likely to occur than others. This is the case, or so Brigandt
holds, because, contrary to the generation of phenotypic variants,
“genetic variation is produced in a largely random and unbiased
fashion.” (Brigandt 2010: 301) Therefore, he concludes, whiche-
ver variations occur must be developmentally grounded.
I think Brigandt’s conclusion is right, but not for the reason he
provides. Whether the production of genetic variations follows
certain patterns or, as Brigandt holds, is carried out in a random
and unbiased fashion, is highly controversial. Of course, molecu-
lar biologists try to prove the former. However, it is not necessary
to decide on these matters in order for the thesis to be true that
whichever phenotypic variation occurs it must be developmentally
grounded. It is sufficient to appeal to the obviously uncontroversi-
al claim that not every genetically produced phenotypic variation
is developmentally possible. From this it follows almost trivially
that it is developmental biology that can, or rather, must explain
which variation was possible, which evolved as a consequence and
which not.
A third reason why neo-Darwinism alone cannot account for evo-
lutionary novelties is that many novelties, such as the evolution of
feathers from reptilian scales, “involve a breaking up of develop-
mental or functional constraints that prevailed in the ancestral
lineage.” (Mu¨ller & Wagner 2003: 220) That is, although both
feathers and scales, have certain developmental roots in common,
it does not follow that feathers evolved as a variation, that is in
a smooth transition, from scales. This is so because feathers are
not within the normal mutational range of scales. Accordingly
scales must have been governed by certain developmental cons-
traints, which, at some point, were broken. And since an account
of novelties has to explain firstly, “how ancestral developmental
constraints could have been and were broken thereby leading to
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the emergence of the novelty“, and secondly, “how the new struc-
ture was developmentally integrated with other structures,” the
main appeal in that account must be to developmental biology
– not to neo-Darwinism. (Brigandt 2010: 302; see also Mu¨ller &
Newman 1999)
The fourth and last reason against the explanatory priority of
neo-Darwinism that I want to mention is that many novelties
are mere by-products of selection, that is, of adaptive evolution.
There are cases where there was no selection for certain tissues
getting close to each other. Here, natural selection is, of course,
causally involved, but it does not carry the explanatory force in
an account of novelty.
The moral of this is that features within organisms must be ex-
planatorily important for the explanation of novelties. Thus, an
account of novelties cannot rely on neo-Darwinistic accounts alo-
ne but rather is in need of knowledge from many different fields,
such as phylogeny, palaeontology, ecology, biogeography, develop-
mental biology and neo-Darwinism. And of course, knowledge of
functional morphology is, also, of importance. For the evolutio-
nary origin of novel structures includes also function features. As
just seen, the case of explaining novelties, as many other cases
as well, does not allow for a reduction to neo-Darwinism. The
same holds for any other of the above-mentioned disciplines. One
important reason is that structures on different levels someti-
mes evolve independently of one another. Therefore, as Brigandt
rightly points out, “biologists have to find the various natural
kinds or units that are relevant for a particular developmental or
evolutionary explanation.” (Brigandt 2010: 303)
The necessary failure of reduction should not lead us to the opi-
nion that evo-devo is just a case of pluralism. Its combination
of different methods and approaches is not a mere accident. On
the contrary, accounting for the evolutionary origin of novelties
makes it necessary to integrate different theoretical models and
modes of explanations. Evo-devo needs both microevolutionary
theories of population genetics and macroevolutionary models of
palaeontology. Both scientific approaches have to be combined
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in this case. The same holds for explanations of developmental
biology and for those of functional morphology. They, too, have
to be integrated with neo-Darwinian modes of explanation. Of
course, as just seen, developmental biology and functional mor-
phology are more explanatory fundamental than neo-Darwinism
in the explanation of novelties. But, and this is the important
point, there is nothing intrinsic about both disciplines that ma-
kes them explanatory fundamental. (Brigandt 2010: 304)
Now, why this extensive discussion of the explanation of novelties
by evo-devo? Because I think this example shows that unification
is not an aim in itself. That there is no general linear ordering
of more or less explanatory fundamental theories or disciplines
does not only show that there is no hierarchy among sciences;
a fact Kitcher himself argued for. It also shows that Brigandt is
right in that epistemic relations between different disciplines are
rather complex and, what is of importance, the relative contribu-
tion and explanatory fundamentality of each approach “depends
on and varies with the particular problem.” (Brigandt 2010: 305)
And each problem has its own criteria of explanatory adequa-
cy. (Love 2008) Thus, what amount of integration or unification
is needed depends on those criteria. They determine the over-
all shape necessary for an explanation. That is, they determine
which theoretical and/or empirical ideas are relevant for solving
a particular problem. Thus, the criteria of explanatory adequacy
– together with the specific problem – not only determine the
amount of unification needed, they determine if a unification of
different methods is necessary at all. Therefore, unification, as I
said, is not an aim in itself, but rather a method that might be
needed for a certain aim, namely for the aim of solving a com-
plex scientific problem. Thus, I completely agree with Brigandt:
In contrast to Kitcher’s “ideal of finding as much unity as we
can” (Kitcher 1999: 339), he recommends “the ideal of finding as
much unity as scientists need in order to solve a scientific pro-
blem.” (Brigandt 2010: 207)
If this is right, then the sciences are not distinguished from non-
sciences by having the aim of unification as a regulative ideal.
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This, together with the discussion at the beginning of this paper,
suggests, then, that the sciences do not share one common end.
And what is more, even a single science does not have specific
ends. In the words of Richard Feynman (Nobel Prize-winner for
physics): “Science is like sex. Sure, it may give some practical
results, but that’s not why we do it.” Thus, the sciences are not
distinguishable by their aims – either from one another and from
non-sciences. Neither do they aim for truth in general, nor for
natural laws, nor for unification.
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